Tuesday, September 25, 2012

Invention/ Knowledge

One of the perennial debates about inventio is where does the process of invention end and the basics of simple knowledge begin? In other words, where is the line between facts and their interpretation?

In Aristotle's conception, rhetoric is "the counterpart of dialectic," or philosophical reasoning. In other words, even if we have "the truth" or "verifiable facts," we must still call upon rhetoric in order to communicate them to others.

Aristotle divides rhetoric into three types of appeals -- the ways in which a speaker can appeal to shared sensibilities of others. These appeals, as we have seen, are ethos (good character), logos (reasoning), and pathos (emotion). By and large, these appeals often gravitate toward reason because not only did the ancient Greeks and Romans prize reason, but so did their commentators during the European Enlightenment and many in our own society today.

Many further read Aristotle to say that appeals to logos and using reasonable proofs can be classified as either examples, maxims, or enthymemes (a shortened syllogism or formal logical statement). All syllogisms, and therefore all enthymemes, use either "signs" or "probabilities" as their material (Rhetoric 1357a, 32ff - 1357b, 1ff). Aristotle provides examples as to how this helps guide reasonable proof-making, and thus ways to use rhetoric in the making of reasonable debate and discourse. By following reason, our discourse reflects truth, reality, and "the way things really are." We might represent Aristotle's schema thus:

Logos - reason
Example
Enthymeme

Signs
Probabilities
Maxim


However, Rev. William M.A. Grimaldi, one of the past century's great commentators on Aristotle, proposes a different reading -- one that turns the received tradition on its head:

Artistic Proofs
Example
Enthymeme
Signs
Probabilities
Special topics
General topics
Ethos
Logos
Pathos

Maxim


In this schema, reason becomes highly subordinated to the rhetorical appeals one can make based on probable, general topics. In other words, rhetoric is not for scholarly debate -- that is more properly the job of dialectic.  Rhetoric is really more for reaching non-specialists. Yet, this also makes the enthymeme "a general method of reasoning" that is shared, often in more syllogistic form, with dialectic. And this is a crucial detail because by making the enthymeme a general and shared form of reasoning, rhetoric insinuates itself into philosophy -- into any search for "truth." As Janet Atwill explains, seen this way, rhetoric "can longer be... a valuable, transferable techne [craft], which, instead of reflecting reality, is capable of creating new versions of the real and the valuable" (p. 206).

We can see here one of the main lines of division over the place of invention in Current-Traditional Rhetorics. Is writing supposed to simply reflect reality a student "discovers" in the books of the library? Or is writing supposed to be an opportunity for students to exercise their general ability to reason on a topic and present their version of it to others? If you believe the former, then all truth is a collection of scientific facts that can't really be questioned unless you are a scientist specializing in that area. Paradoxically, the latter allows any one to use rhetoric in order to question the knowledge produced through dialectic.

So, do you think anyone should be able to question science? If not science, then what about social order? Or even dissent over how to live your personal life? Where is the line? How does the line for you turn on where you think we, as a society or as humans or as some other category, ought to rely on persuasion and where we ought to rely on some consensual definition/ acceptance of "reality"?